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In his work, T. F. Torrance (1913–2007) formulated an intellectually 
robust and Christologically-grounded account of the relationship 
between divine self-revelation and human reason.1 An important 
but under-utilized resource for understanding what would become 
Torrance’s mature view of the nature and purpose of reason in Christian 
theology is the correspondence between Torrance and the American 
idealist and rationalist Brand Blanshard (1892–1987) published in 
The Scotsman daily newspaper throughout April 1952. In these letters, 
Torrance and Blanshard clash over (i) the nature of reason and (ii) the 
purpose of reason in Christian theology. To date, these letters have 
largely been neglected in the secondary literature.2 However, the 
letters are deeply significant as a point of convergence of the emphases 
in Torrance’s earlier thought over what reason is and what reason is 
for, and the themes raised are in continuity with Torrance’s mature 
contribution, indicating a fundamental continuity across the whole of 
Torrance’s corpus regarding the nature and function of reason. 
This essay argues that in these exchanges, Torrance displays a 
commitment to two principles that would become determinative 
aspects of his mature approach to the nature and function of reason in 
Christian theology. First, Torrance makes clear his opposition to the 
autonomy of reason, exercised in self-sufficient abstraction from the 
subject-matter under inquiry. Second, Torrance affirms the necessity 
of reason in Christian theology, arguing that its proper function is to 
enable the conforming of our thought to reality. These early views 
would come to fruition in Torrance’s mature thought through (i) the 
contrast between object-making thought and objective thought; (ii) 
the attenuated function he attributed to formal logic; and (iii) for his 
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elaboration on the distinctive function of human reason in theology 
through his reconstruction of natural theology.
The occasion for the exchange between Blanshard and Torrance 
was Blanshard’s Gifford Lectures (1952–53). During a lecture 
delivered on April 10, 1952, Blanshard criticised what he called the 
‘theology of crisis’, focussing particularly on the thought of Karl Barth. 
Blanshard castigated what he perceived to be the supremacy Barth 
gave to faith and revelation over and above the laws of reason. For 
Blanshard, Barth’s prioritization of God’s self-revelation and human 
faith is nothing short of the derogation of reason, and the exclusion 
of rational thinking from the theological enterprise.3 For Torrance, 
who had just set out on the project of providing a new translation of 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics into the English language, and who had 
founded the Scottish Journal of Theology (a journal sympathetic to 
Barth’s theology) just four years previously, the provocation was too 
much. Torrance responded with a terse open letter in The Scotsman 
on April 14, 1952, which led to an exchange that extended through 
the following fortnight. In this connection, these letters are worthy of 
study for their function in the reception of Barth’s thought in Scotland.
Torrance and Blanshard
At the time of the exchange, Torrance and Blanshard were at different 
points in their respective academic careers and their respective patterns 
of thought were following very different trajectories.
In April 1952, Torrance was early in his academic career. He still 
held the post of Professor of Church History in New College with his 
transfer to the Chair of Christian Dogmatics some months away (on 
1 October, 1952).4 The previous decade of Torrance’s life had been 
devoted, in the main part, to pastoral responsibilities, first in Alyth 
(1940–43) and then in Beechgrove (1945–50), including a period 
of war-time service (1943–45). This decade of parish ministry was 
not a period of academic stasis for Torrance, with some thirty-six 
publications to his credit by the end of it, including the publication of 
his doctoral thesis in 1946 and his landmark study Calvin’s Doctrine 
of Man (1949). Moreover, in a subsequent interview, Torrance 
reflected that his ten years in pastoral ministry ‘enabled [him] to 
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think theologically’,5 as he learnt to bring his academic learning into 
correspondence with the lived reality of those under his pastoral care. 
Torrance’s theological influences through his time in Edinburgh 
(1931–37) are of significance to understanding his early thought. 
From A. E. Taylor, Torrance learnt of the trans-subjective criterion of 
‘good’ that takes priority over personal judgement.6 It was from Taylor, 
McGrath notes, that Torrance took his view of the ontological ground 
of moral obligations as the criterion of right action in a centre beyond 
the human self.7 Daniel Lamont insisted in his 1934 text, Christ and 
the World of Thought (1934), that the early twentieth century was ‘in 
the midst of a revolution in every domain of knowledge’ characterised 
by a reaction against the imposition of human rational structures upon 
reality.8 The impact of this upon Torrance is demonstrated by his 
reaction to John Baillie’s The Interpretation of Religion (1928):
[…] in Kantian fashion he [Baillie] sought first to establish a 
method of inquiry apart from the subject-matter of his inquiry 
[…]. I found this epistemology untenable, not least in the light 
of the overthrow by general relativity of a dualist Kantian 
approach to knowledge, of which we learnt from Lamont […] 9
From Lamont, Torrance learnt that logical method must not be 
separated from subject-matter.10 H. R. Mackintosh impressed upon 
Torrance the conviction that God is known only through God’s self-
disclosure through the Son,11 whereby theology is envisioned as 
an open engagement with God who personally shapes our thought 
concerning him.12 On this basis, Torrance learnt from Mackintosh 
the necessity of the conjunction of faith and reason, through which 
humans do not abandon logic, but rather exercise their rationality in 
an orientation of openness to that which cannot be known through 
human reason alone.13 Beyond Edinburgh, Torrance studied under 
Karl Barth from 1937 to 1938. Torrance later wrote that he learnt from 
Barth the epistemological significance of the unity of the being and 
act of God: to know God through the Son, is to know God as he is in 
himself such that God himself controls our knowing of him.14 With 
human thought thus ontologically controlled, Torrance held that Barth 
insulated theology from any appeal to an ‘independent conceptual 
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system reached before and apart from the actual knowledge of God’.15
In his early writings (1938–49), Torrance recognises the validity 
of reason in Christian thought but insists that reason is to behave 
in accordance with reality. Torrance’s Auburn Lectures (1938–39) 
demonstrate some awareness of the ‘belief in the ultimate consistency 
of things as they are in themselves’ to determine human thought of 
reality.16 Within Christian theology, Torrance argues for Christological 
exclusivity in which (on account of the identity of nature between the 
Father and the Son) God’s revelation is a self-revelation such that ‘We 
must learn to think of God exclusively in terms of Christ’.17 The priority 
of God’s grace in human knowledge of God ‘means a disqualification 
of human capabilities and powers as rendering possible an approach 
of [humanity] to God’.18 In this early work, Torrance set aside any 
claim to the knowledge of God which is not entirely a posteriori, 
dependent on God’s self-revelation.
In an unpublished paper of 1940, “Christian Thinking Today”, 
Torrance argues that knowledge of God was not ‘something that 
we already have’ but something which ‘must be brought TO our 
thinking’.19 Therefore, to think in a ‘Christian’ way could not be by 
the application of the norms and innate functions of the human mind: 
Christianity must not be forced ‘into the framework of the modern 
system of ideas’.20 It is in his 1942 article “The Place and Function of 
Reason in Christian Theology” that the young Torrance’s antipathy to 
the autonomy of reason is most clearly expressed. For Torrance, the 
autonomy of reason ‘belongs to the very essence of sin’ and should 
be viewed as humanity’s self-emancipation from faithful obedience.21 
From this basis, Torrance insists upon the heteronomy of reason: 
‘reason is not a law unto itself, but submits itself to the rule of God’.22 
The form of reason applicable to theology is a ‘filled reason’,23 by 
which Torrance means it is open to determination from beyond itself. 
Very importantly, Torrance identifies the need to integrate intuitive 
and discursive reason in which the inferential activity of the human 
mind is affirmed, but only under the direct determination of the reality 
encountered.24
Blanshard, on the other hand, was at the peak of a distinguished 
career, serving as the Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at 
Yale University, still some ten years away from retirement in 1961. 
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Quite unlike Torrance, Blanshard was an idealist and a rationalist.25 
His two-volume work The Nature of Thought has been described as 
the most accomplished contribution to idealist epistemology of the 
twentieth century.26 In it Blanshard contended that while there is 
something external to the observer that provokes the disturbance of 
his or her sensibility (i.e. Blanshard is not a metaphysical idealist after 
the tradition of George Berkeley), the affected sensibility is prepared 
for cognition through the forms of intuition,27 which are subsequently 
rendered intelligible through the categories of understanding.28 
Therefore, for Blanshard, truth is delimited by the judgement of 
the transcendental ego.29 With such an epistemic (as opposed to 
ontological) conception of truth, it follows that, so far as Blanshard 
was concerned, the internal coherence (‘knowledge in which every 
judgement entailed, and was entailed by, the rest of the system’30) of 
statements is presented as the criterion of truth.31 
Blanshard’s rationalism is demonstrated by his view of rational 
thought as the capacity to develop rational systems of necessary 
knowledge conceived discursively by the application of human 
reason, free from the constraint and direction of ontological 
correlates.32 Reason, Blanshard contended, proceeded in accordance 
with its own established laws and norms via deduction from fixed 
axioms to logically necessary conclusions.33 For example, Blanshard 
considered Euclidean geometry, with its discursive movement from 
five foundational axioms, to constitute a perfect rational system.34 
Blanshard argues that reason must be identified as the intellectual 
grasp of principles that order knowledge that are independent of 
experience, and as such constitutes a closed set of principles.35 Logical 
coherence is, therefore, an excluding principle in Blanshard’s thought: 
a fully coherent system is closed to anything which contradicts the 
unfolding of human reason.
Clearly, Torrance and Blanshard were never going to see eye-to-
eye, especially when it came to Karl Barth.
Blanshard’s criticism of Barth
In his Gifford Lectures, Blanshard was asked to address the place 
of reason and the theory of knowledge in theology and ethics.36 
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Blanshard delivered the first set of lectures “Reason and Its Critics” 
between February and May 1952.37 In this set, Blanshard subjected the 
‘theology of crisis’ to fierce criticism for its refusal to identify human 
reason alone as the criterion of truth. The substance of Blanshard’s 
critique is that Barth’s theology is unacceptable on account of the fact 
that it is a species of irrationalism – an irrationalism, furthermore, 
which apparently denied the independent status of human reason in 
determining what it regarded as true.38 For example, Blanshard argues 
that Barth’s thought allows for paradox, which is unacceptable to 
reason as it violates principles of natural logic, specifically the law of 
non-contradiction.39 As such, Blanshard argues that Barth’s thought 
constitutes a revolt against reason,40 because (i) it does not function 
via the laws of logical inference from axioms and so (ii) challenges 
the idea that theological knowledge may develop independent from 
God’s self-revelation.41 In this, the themes of Blanshard’s critique of 
Barth are continuous with those of the Barth-Scholz dispute of 1932.42 
Interestingly, a very similar critique was to be made of Torrance 
from the perspective of the analytic theology of religion by Donald 
Klinefelter in 1972.43
The exchange
In a terse letter of April 14, 1952, Torrance rejects Blanshard’s 
identification of Barth’s theology as the dissolution of reason in 
Christian theology. Pointing to Barth’s study of Anselm’s Fides 
quaerens intellectum (1931), Torrance argues that ‘Barth holds to 
the basic point that reason is unconditionally bound to its object and 
determined by it, and that the nature of the object must prescribe the 
specific mode of activity of reason.’44 Far from being a volte face 
from rational thought, Torrance contends that this is a clear example 
of reason conceived of as conforming the mind to reality. The object 
of theology (God in his self-revelation) is a unique object and so 
theological thought must, by derivation, be unique. Therefore the 
rationality of theology is no more than thought that ‘corresponds 
with this unique object of thought’.45 In such a context, faith is not 
irrationalism but rather is ‘reason directed to the knowledge of God, 
and involves a rational apprehension which answers appropriately the 
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object given’.46 Torrance’s view of reason, in contrast to Blanshard’s, 
is striking for its minimalism. There are no innate functions codified 
in logic but only the capacity to think in accordance with the reality 
in question.
In Blanshard’s response (April 16, 1952), it becomes clear that 
Torrance and Blanshard are operating with two very different 
understandings of reason.47 Blanshard reaffirms his insistence 
upon the irrational status of the theology of Barth, identifying 
Barth’s rejection of natural theology as evidence of this. Theology, 
Blanshard implies, is rational when it operates in accordance with 
the laws that are innate to the intelligent mind. Barth’s rejection of 
natural theology as the ‘herald’ of autonomous humanity,48 and the 
associated insistence upon the absolute priority of God establishing 
proportionality between himself and human thought only through his 
self-revelation is clearly discontinuous with Blanshard’s view of the 
place of reason in Christian theology. Torrance, Blanshard continues, 
can only defend Barth’s notion of reason by operating ‘with a special 
meaning’ of reason, which is a ‘very different meaning from that of 
the philosophers.’49
Undeterred, in his next letter (April 19, 1952) Torrance insists 
that Blanshard’s analysis of Barth has been skewed by his failure to 
recognise that Barth inhabited a different tradition from Blanshard’s 
own. Torrance distinguishes between different forms of reason, noting 
that Barth’s understanding of reason must be understood within the 
frame of a realist and critical view of reason. Within this tradition, 
Torrance explains, reason does not proceed in accordance with its own 
laws and norms but must rather submit itself to those logical patterns 
of inquiry which are determined from the side of the object.50 Torrance 
refers to John Macmurray as an exponent of this tradition: 
John Macmurray, like Heinrich and Karl Barth, is concerned 
to point philosophy and theology away from a substantival to 
a functional view of reason, and when [Macmurray] says that 
“reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the 
object […],” he is using language almost identical with that of 
Karl Barth […] 51
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Torrance contends that ‘Professor Blanshard appears to think of reason 
as behaving in terms of its own nature, in terms of its own categories 
of understanding’.52 From within the perspective of this philosophical 
tradition, Torrance contends that what Blanshard thinks of as ‘reason’ is 
not reason at all, but rather of a ‘diseased “rationalism”’, characterized 
by the compulsion to ‘go its own way [refusing] to be determined by 
its object’.53
Moreover, Torrance argues that Blanshard’s own view of reason 
was illegitimate on scientific and religious grounds. Torrance argues 
that Blanshard’s view of reason is antithetical to the basic scientific 
principle that ‘the nature of the object must prescribe the specific 
mode of the activity of reason’.54 Within such a frame of thought, 
Torrance concludes that reason must be used critically as opposed to 
the untrammelled freedom given to it by Blanshard:
What theology demands, therefore, declares Karl Barth, is a 
ruthless scientific criticism of the activity of reason and of the 
reasoner himself to ensure that here in theological science he is 
behaving rationally, that is, that here his reason is conforming 
properly and obediently to the object given. All science, 
be it theology or physics, is characterised by humility and a 
readiness for the most ruthless self-criticism.55
The telos of reason, Torrance suggests, is to conform the understanding 
to the object beyond the knowing subject. Blanshard’s view of reason 
is innately antithetical to this fundamental goal, concerned instead 
with the application and exploration of its own innate capacities. 
Finally, Torrance argues that Blanshard’s understanding of the nature 
and purpose of reason is particularly inappropriate within Christian 
theology on account of the distinctive object with which theology 
must be concerned:
The object of theological knowledge is God infinite and eternal 
“always Subject”. As Barth puts it, not “the absolutely other” 
(a notion which Barth cast away many years ago), but the 
living God who gives Himself to us and reveals Himself in 
Jesus Christ, and summons us to obedient conformity to Him. 
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In Christian theology, therefore, reason is summoned to behave 
in terms of Jesus Christ […] 56
Reason in Christian theology cannot proceed as if its object were inert. 
Instead, in Christian theology, reason is reactive to the self-revelation 
of God and has a duty of obedience to God. In this connection, 
Torrance introduces the doctrine of sin to the discussion, not in terms 
of the attenuation of humanity’s cognitive faculties, but (as was 
characteristic of his early thought) in terms of the sinful application 
of human reason as ‘the attempt of reason to behave in terms of itself 
and its own norms instead of behaving in terms of the love of Christ’.57
The divergence in what the two men mean by ‘reason’ is by 
now very clear – a fact Blanshard comments on in his penultimate 
letter (April 20, 1952). Blanshard reiterates that he and Torrance are 
speaking of reason in two different ways.58 Blanshard identifies reason 
as the ‘standards of natural reason’ and insists that these are ‘valid 
for the knowledge of God’, and argues that to stretch the meaning of 
reason as Torrance does is unacceptable.59 However, in his final letter 
in the exchange (April 23, 1952), Torrance closes off the conclusion 
that he and Blanshard are operating with two incompatible but equal 
forms of reason. Instead, Torrance suggests that Blanshard holds a 
view of the supremacy of reason as that which ‘exists independently of 
the objectively given world’ and as that which ‘bears within itself the 
condition of understanding the truth’.60 Such a view of reason as itself 
containing the foundations of its right application, Torrance argues, 
has been rendered redundant by the new unitive frame of thought in 
the natural sciences and metaphysics: reality is inherently intelligible 
and does not need rational coherence to be imposed upon it; rather, 
the role of reason is to uncover the intelligibility inherent in reality.61
The priority of the intelligibility inherent in reality over our thought 
concerning it is re-iterated in Torrance’s appeal to the threefold ratio 
of truth in Anselm’s thought in which the ratio of the Truth itself is 
fundamental over and above the rational experience of faith and the 
rational conformity of faith to its object:62
Accordingly, Karl Barth has sought to evolve a new method of 
theological exposition in which, while seeking out in Anselmian 
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fashion the full rationality of faith in obedience to the Truth, he 
tries to formulate and communicate it as a whole.63
In this connection, Torrance presents his rejection of Blanshard’s 
notion of an autonomous reason that proceeds in accordance with 
its own internal laws and coherence. He insists once again that the 
internal truth of reality must determine how it is to be known. As a 
result of this, the truth of God, far from being determined by the laws 
of human reason, transcends human concepts.64 In this way, Torrance 
forcefully rejects the independent validity of natural reason. However, 
he recognises that reason has a role in facilitating the unfolding and 
comprehension of revelation, in continuity with his affirmation of the 
unity of intuitive and discursive reason some ten years earlier.
Tracing trajectories in Torrance’s mature thought
In these exchanges, Torrance’s thought on the nature of the function 
of reason is cast into sharp relief. Torrance will have nothing to do 
with reason that is autonomous from, or antecedent to, determination 
from the side of reality. Torrance rejects the view that reason operates 
according to its own norms and laws and argues that the true telos of 
reason is to facilitate the knowledge of reality as it is in itself. The 
emphases found in Torrance’s thought at this early stage are continuous 
with Torrance’s later thought. However, in Torrance’s mature thought, 
these same perspectives are marked by greater epistemological and 
theological sophistication. These continuities and developments can 
be mentioned only in outline.
First, Torrance’s fierce resistance to Blanshard’s view of reason 
operating in accordance with its own norms and laws, acting with 
imperious disregard for the actual nature of reality, flowers in 1971 
with his pointed antithesis between true objectivity and ‘objectifying’ 
thought.65 Objectifying thought is that which conditions its own 
knowledge by imposing an ‘inflexible conceptual structure’ on that 
which it experiences.66 Central here is Torrance’s critique of Kant for 
transferring absolute space and time as a regulative structure into the 
human mind as the forms of intuition67 through which intelligibility 
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is imposed upon phenomena.68 On the other hand, true objectivity, 
Torrance argues, takes ‘its shape from the structure of the object’,69 
allowing the inherent intelligibility of reality to determine what is 
thought of it.70
Second, Torrance’s resistance to Blanshard’s affirmation of the 
sole sufficiency of reason develops, in Torrance’s mature thought, to 
his nuanced stance on the place and the limitations of formal logic 
in Theological Science (1969). Torrance argues that formal logic has 
a vital role to play in developing systems of thought characterised 
by valid inference, but rejects the exclusive use of symbolic formal 
notation on the grounds that it separates logical inference from actual 
connections in reality.71 Instead, Torrance argues that the application 
of human reason in the development of logically valid systems of 
thought is to enable ‘us to see more clearly the objective relations 
in the real world’.72 It is in this sense that Torrance has proposed 
the synthesis of discursive reason and intuitive reason through the 
unification of coherence statements and existence statements so as to 
develop conceptual systems that are fully determined by reality, in 
which human reason has a place of integrity.73
Third, concerning the place of reason in theology in particular, 
Torrance’s rejection of Blanshard’s view that theology should take 
place through the application of reason in accordance with its own 
innate laws eventually comes to fruition in Torrance’s rejection and 
reconstruction of natural theology. Torrance rejected autonomous 
natural theology as an idealized rational structure developed 
prior to positive knowledge of God in his self-revelation. Natural 
theology only imposes cognizable form upon God’s self-revelation 
and inevitably distorts it (i.e. autonomous natural theology is like 
object-making thought in Torrance’s view).74 In his reconstruction 
of natural theology Torrance re-envisions natural theology as the 
internal rational structure of theology under the determination of 
God’s self-revelation through which the inherent Trinitarian structure 
of God’s self-revelation is cognized and articulated in human forms 
of thought.75 In this connection, natural theology has become a human 
rational structure determined by God’s self-revelation, the conjunction 
of which constitutes theological science:
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[…] the integration of natural and positive theology within 
one bipolar structure of knowledge [is] the knitting together of 
epistemological structure and material content [which] yields 
what we are bound to call “theological science” […] 76
In this, the place and function of human reason in Christian theology 
is affirmed. However, its nature is not autonomous, but is dependent 
on revelation. Its purpose, furthermore, is not to unfold a perfect, 
coherent system of knowledge, discursively conceived by an analysis 
of ‘God’ as concept (contra the ontological argument), but rather to 
shape human thought in accordance with the inner structure of God’s 
self-revelation.
Conclusion
The Blanshard correspondence is an important but hitherto under-
utilized part of a full understanding of Torrance’s views regarding the 
nature and function of reason in Christian theology. This essay has 
(i) described the development of Torrance’s thought up until 1949; 
(ii) identified that these perspectives converge in Torrance’s polemic 
against Blanshard in 1952; and (iii) traced how the emphases from 
the Blanshard letters develop in Torrance’s mature thought. The 
same basic orientation on the nature and function of reason persists 
throughout Torrance’s career: reason does not proceed in accordance 
with its own innate laws but is subordinate to reality and is orientated 
to bringing human thought under the determination of that which 
reality is.
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